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Covered Employment and Compensable Injury
Concepts in Tennessee
Robert N. Covington*
This article surveys the existing law of Tennessee applicable to the
problems of determining what is covered employment and what consti-
tutes a compensable injury. The survey indicates no radical differences
between the law of Tennessee and that of most American jurisdictions,
although there are a few troublesome problems in particular areas, such
as the "Act of God" and "positional risk" cases.
I. SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
The purpose of this article is a simple one: to discuss the "who,
what, when and where" of compensable injuries under the workmen's
compensation statute of Tennessee. By "who" we refer to the problem
of who is an employer and who an employee within the meaning of
the statutory definitions. The "what" concerns the meaning of acci-
dental injury. "When and where" involve the familar problems of
"arising out of and in the course of employment." Other related prob-
lems, such as the benefit structure under the statute, the application
of exclusive remedy provisions, and procedural limitations on recovery,
are omitted save as they bear on these particular issues.
The overall development of workmen's compensation law in Ten-
nessee has not differed greatly from that of most jurisdictions. In 1919,
when the basic compensation statute was enacted, Tennessee courts
were still applying familiar tort law concepts to employee injuries. At
first, there was a natural tendency to carry over some of those prin-
ciples in the interpretation of the compensation act.' Yet even in the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty editor, Vanderbilt Law
Review. This article is based upon a speech delivered at the Institute on Employee
Injuries held at the Vanderbilt University School of Law in November of 1962.
In the course of this essay, the reader will discover few citations to law review
articles. The reason is that most of the Tennessee problems involved have been dealt
with in articles that are probably familiar to most attorneys in the state. Rather than
list them repeatedly through the course of the notes, it has been decided to list them
here in a group. In general, the reader is directed to the article on workmen's com-
pensation developments included each year in the Annual Survey of Tennessee Law.
On the problem of covered employment, consult the recent case comments at 27 TENN.
L. REv. 317 (1960); 24 TENN. L. REv. 317 (1957). On compensability, consult the stu-
dent note in 8 VA o. L. REv. 616 (1955) and these recent case comments: 29 TENN. L.
REv. 477 (1962); 7 VAND). L. ryEv. 861 (1954); 12 TENN. L. REv. 140 (1934).
1. Milne v. Sanders, 143 Tenn. 602, 619-20, 228 S.W. 702, 706 (1920). In this case,
the court stated: "As a general rule, where an employee is intentionally injured by a
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first major decision involving the statute2 the Tennessee Supreme
Court evinced sympathy for its basic purpose, and in the years since
then the court has construed the statutory provisions with a liberality
in accord with the act's remedial intent. The basic structure of the
statute has not been radically altered since its enactment; the majority
of the amendments have been clarifications or have involved only
minor changes. The most important alteration was probably the addi-
tion of the occupational disease provisions in 1947. With the enact-
ment of those provisions, the compensation act assumed very much the
character in which we find it today, and in this article we concern
ourselves principally with cases that have been decided since that
time.
II. COVERED EMPLOYmNT
A. ExiStence of the Employment Relation
The obvious first step in determining whether there is employment
covered by the statute is to determine whether there is an employment
relation. The primary guides are the definitions of "employer" and
"employee" in the statute:
"Employer" shall include any individual, firm, association or corporation...
using the services of not less than five persons for pay. If the employer is
insured, it shall include his insurer, unless otherwise herein provided.
4
"Employee" shall include every person, including a minor, whether lawfully
or unlawfully employed ...in the service of an employer ...under any
contract of hire, apprenticeship, written or implied.
5
These definitions are typically broad. They require only that there be
(1) a person (2) using (a term which has not attracted much atten-
tion, although there are some implications in it that might bear
exploring) (3) services (4) of at least five persons (the number re-
quirement can be waived, which makes one wonder whether it should
appear in the basic definition) (5) under contracts of hire. In spite of
the apparent simplicity of the definitions, there have been a number
of problems concerning their outer limits.
1. The Employee-Contractor Distinction.-The Tennessee courts,
fellow servant, there is no liability." Ibid. This is essentially a carry-over of the com-
mon law fellow-servant rule so far as intentional torts are concerned. The compensation
statute does not draw the distinction between intentional and negligent acts in its terms,
so that the statement is obviously of tort-law derivation. The Tennessee court has
not retained this notion. See the material on assaults below at 1151-52.
2. Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.V. 844 (1919).
3. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1947, ch. 139, codified as chapter 11 of title 50 of the code.
4. TENi. CDE AN. § 50-902(a) (1956).
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-902(b) (Supp. 1963).
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like those in almost every other jurisdiction, have interpreted the
compensation act's "employee" to be the equivalent of the common
law's "servant"-that type of agent whose employer ("master") is liable
for torts of the servant committed in the scope of the servant's employ-
ment.6 While this approach is subject to criticism because it has led
too often to the proliferation of intricate and minute legal niceties
not reflected in the actualities of industrial employment,7 it is funda-
mentally sound. If the purpose of compensation legislation is reflected
in the campaign slogan "The cost of the product should bear the blood
of the workman," then it makes considerable sense that an individual
who has the opportunity to set the price of the product should not
ordinarily be considered an employee.8 Independent contractors may
usually be regarded as fitting that description; they are thought of as
entrepreneurs, in business on their own, able by their own decision and
initiative to influence directly the price of goods or services in the
market place. The problem, of course, is that people do not order their
affairs so as to fit into the compact categories set up by lawyers and
judges; all too often we encounter individuals who are more independ-
ent and free-wheeling than the ordinary servant, yet less able to direct
the course of their business than the ordinary entrepreneur. How are
the courts to go about deciding whether to tack on the label of servant
or independent contractor?
The traditional approach has been, of course, to ascertain whether
the alleged employer has the right to control the details of work in
6. See, e.g., Brademeyer v. Chickasaw Bldg. Co., 190 Tenn. 239, 229 S.W.2d 323
(1950) (window cleaner subject to supervision and to immediate firing not an independ-
ent contractor); Siskin v. Johnson, 151 Tenn. 93, 268 S.W. 630 (1924) (car unloader
working without any supervision on piece rate held an independent contractor and thus
not entitled to compensation). The court specifically determined to use the term
"servant" as equivalent of "employee" in Finley v. Keisling, 151 Tenn. 464, 270 S.W.
629 (1924) (citing tort cases and treatises on master and servant). See also STONE &
WiLmAmS, TENSSEE WonKAmN's Comps'msA-noN §§ 40-42 (1957).
7. The best known criticism on this basis is probably that in Mr. Justice Rutledge's
opinion in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944) ("employee' held
not to mean "servant" for purposes of Wagner Act). The court was legislatively over-
ruled shortly afterwards. See Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 137 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958). The court has since used another means of avoiding the
narrow limits of the "servant" concept-expanding the notion of who is a servant under
common law rules. See, e.g., United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947) ("economics
reality" as a factor in determining who is a servant). This approach is more akin to.
what the Tennessee court has done.
8. See 1 LARSON, WORKmEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 43.20, .51 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as LAnsoN]. Under the circumstances indicated, the individual would be able to.
protect himself against the ills of industrial injury. With the growth of the insurance
industry this argument has particular appeal, since small entrepreneurs do have available
a ready means of protecting themselves: health and disability insurance contracts. Quem,
however, whether even the more flexible modem policies offer adequate protection.
See Somans & SoMEns, DocTORs, PATIENTS AND. HE.TH INSuRiANcE 335-82 (Anchor
ed. 1962).
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connection with the service rendered.9 But this test itself is notably
flexible. As Justice Felts said in Smart v. Embry: "Each case must de-
pend upon its own facts and ordinarily there is no one infallible test,
but all the circumstances must be looked to; and the question is ordi-
narily one of fact."10 If this is indeed a question of fact, then it should
normally be left to the judge who is the primary trier of the fact, and
the Tennessee Supreme Court has said as much." This does not mean,
however, that the existence of the employment relation is a question
that the appellate courts cannot consider. The right to control is
ordinarily a contract-based right; and interpretation of contracts, while
properly regarded as a matter of fact, must often be treated as if it
were a matter of law, reviewable by appellate tribunals on that basis.
12
Seals v. ZoIJo13 demonstrates the willingness of the Tennessee Su-
preme Court to review the decisions of lower tribunals concerning the
existence of the employment relation. In that case, the claimant was
a sixty-six-year-old ice cream peddler who bought ice cream products
from the defendant at wholesale prices and sold them to his route
customers at retail prices. Thus his compensation amounted to what
would usually be called "profit" rather than "wages." On this basis,
the lower court held that claimant could not recover since he was not
an employee. When the decision was appealed, the supreme court
went beyond this bookkeeping method to consider other facts in the
record it felt to be important. The opinion, written by Chief Justice
Neil, reviews these facts at some length: the defendant company, not
the claimant, owned the cart used in the work; its products were
advertised in detail on the cart; claimant's hours were fixed by com-
pany practice (though not by any official "rule"); peddlers such as
claimant were given instructions on how to do their job, they were
told not to drink, and those found violating this rule were fired; credit
to ordinary customers of defendant was for a month, but to those in
claimant's position was only for a day-i.e., at the end of each day
peddlers paid for the ice cream they checked out in the morning.
After reviewing these facts, the court states: "The statement above,
that is the factual situation as to the relationship of the parties, is
9. REsTATEAmNT (SECOND), AcENcy § 220(1) (1958). It is unfortunate that this
has so little to do with the injured claimant's ability to obtain adequate protection for
himself outside the compensation act. See 1 LARSON §§ 43.41-.54.
10. Smart v. Embry, 208 Tenn. 686, 690, 348 S.W.2d 322, 324 (1960).
11. Barker v. Curtis, 199 Tenn. 413, 419, 287 S.W.2d 43, 46 (1955).
12. 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 554 (1960): "[T]he question of what is the meaning that
should be given by a court to the words of a contract is a question of fact, not a
question of law. . . .We must bear in mind, however, that this question of fact is
like other questions of fact in this: it may be a question that should be answered by
the judge rather than by the jury. In cases in which it is so answered, it is probable
that interpretation of language is a 'question for the court."'
13. 205 Tenn. 463, 327 S.W.2d 41 (1958).
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practically without conflict. This being true we think the question
relating to this contractual relationship is solely one of law."'4 The
opinion then reiterates the court's policy to construe the compensation
act liberally in favor of finding a claimant to be an employee,15 and
goes on to consider in detail the effect of each of the arrangements
listed in the statement of facts on the business independence of the
claimant. The opinion places particular emphasis on the ability of
the defendant to discharge any of its peddlers at will and on the fact
that defendant owned the peddler's cart, the most expensive item of
equipment needed to conduct trade. Perhaps the most significant
passage in the opinion is the paragraph in which the court pointedly
refuses to feel constrained by "the theory that it is part of the political
history of this State that 'peddlers' were regarded as being engaged in
an independent occupation.... ."16 The old labels sometimes cannot be
carried over into the modem business situation. In this instance the
"peddler" method of operation was not a method selected by the
peddler as an independent calling, but a method "designed by an
employer solely for his own protection"' and "which was necessary to
the successful management of its business."',
The fact-by-fact approach to the employment relation used in Seals
v. Zollo is the generally accepted method of dealing with these prob-
lems. Section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency is one of
the most excellent formulations of this technique, and it may safely
be asserted that that section is indicative of the Tennessee view. 19 It
should be pointed out that the existence of a factor indicating the
presence of a right to control is generally more significant than the
absence of such a factor.2" For example, in Barker v. Curtis,21 the fact
14. Id. at 469, 327 S.W.2d at 43. (Emphasis added.)
15. Id. at 470, 327 S.W.2d at 44. This principle has long been enunciated, and is
reflected in cases stating that there is a presumption that one performing services for
another is an employee. See Carter v. Hodges, 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211 (1939).
16. 205 Tenn. at 472, 327 S.W.2d at 45.
17. Id. at 475, 327 S.W.2d at 46. (Emphasis added.)
18. Id. at 473, 327 S.W.2d at 45. (Emphasis added.)
19. The section is quoted and its application to a Tennessee tort decision is discussed
in Render, Agency-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REV. 627, 630-32 (1963)
(note the narrower use of "servant" in the present article).
20. "[F]or the most part, [the presence of] any simple factor is not merely indica-
tive of but, in practice, virtually proof of the employment relation; while, in the
opposite direction, contrary evidence is as to any one factor at best only mildly persua-
sive evidence of contractorship, and sometimes is of almost no such force at all." 1
LAmsON § 44.31. The reason would seem obvious. The presence of one fact alone-
the power to hire and fire, for example-may have the effect of giving the person who
has that power almost total dominance over another's work, while the absence of that
fact would not necessarily deprive him of dominance-if, for instance, he exchanged
the power to hire and fire for the power to control prices. It seems equally apparent
that it is the extent rather than the existence of such powers which is significant; the




that the defendant, owner of a coal mine, paid compensation insur-
ance premiums on the claimant was felt to be of greater importance
than the fact that the defendant had not been paying social security
taxes on claimant's behalf.
Barker demonstrates how, on occasion, a hiring party must choose
between two risks: the risk of being held covered by the compensa-
tion act, or the risk of being without insurance. Bond Brothers v.
Spence22 provides another illustration of the same sort. In that case
an individual who hauled logs for another at a rate of seven dollars
a thousand (or somewhat more, depending on the distance of the
haul) was held to be an employee of the other, largely because the
checks issued to him contained a stipulation that all dealings between
the two were in accordance with the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act. It is only fair to say that other interpretations of the stipulation
were possible, but the court determined that it meant the defendant
acknowledged the log-hauler to be an employee under FLSA.2
2. Loaned Employees.-There have been relatively few cases in-
volving "loaned employees" in Tennessee.24 The few that have reached
the courts have been typical of such cases throughout the nation, and
have normally involved an employee who was sent out by his general
employer to operate machinery which was being leased by the
general employer to the alleged special employer. There are three
possible relations that can result from this lending: (1) the employee
may remain exclusively in the service of the general employer;25 (2)
the employee may leave the service of the general employer and be
regarded as solely the employee of the special employer;2 or (3)
the employee may be regarded as being simultaneously the employee
21. 199 Tenn. 413, 287 S.W.2d 43 (1955).
22. 198 Tenn. 316, 279 S.W.2d 509 (1955).
23. In this regard it should be pointed out that stipulations in an agreement to the
effect that a given individual is not an employee are of little, if any, effect. Schroader
v. Rural Educ. Ass'n, 33 Tenn. App. 36, 228 S.W.2d 491 (M.S. 1950).
24. Cradic v. Eastman Kodak Co., 202 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Kempkau
v. Cathey, 198 Tenn. 17, 277 S.W.2d 392 (1955); Owen v. St. Louis Spring Co., 175
Tenn. 543, 136 S.W.2d 498 (1940); Wardrep v. Houston, 168 Tenn. 170 76 S.W,2d 328
(1934); Wilmoth v. Phoenix Util. Co., 168 Tenn. 95, 75 S.W.2d 48 (1934).
25. Owen v. St. Louis Spring Co., supra note 24. The claimant was sent by the
general employer to show employees of the alleged special employer how to use equip-
ment sold by the general employer. The general employer was obligated to do so by
contract with the alleged special employer. Held, the general employment continued.
26. Kempkau v. Cathey, supra note 24. The claimant, a truck driver, was directed
to help a general foreman of the company move some personal belongings. The general
employer paid for the time spent, although it had nothing to do with his business. The
claimant was given orders on how to do the work by the foreman, and was also given
three dollars by the foreman in addition to what the employer was paying. Held,
claimant was a loaned employee to whom only the special employer was liable for
injuries.
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of both.27 How does one tell which relation exists? The Tennessee
cases have in language adopted an unhelpful approach, for they state
that the prime test is: "In whose work was the employee engaged
at the time, i.e., whose work was being done?"28 Such a "test" is not
really a test at all, but only a rephrasing of the question: "Who is
the employer?" Fortunately, while nominally using the "whose busi-
ness" test, the Tennessee courts have in fact adopted a more consistent
approach: "Does the special employer have the right or duty to direct
the details of performance of the work?"29
In effect this means that if "the temporary employer exercises such
control over the conduct of the employee as would make the employee
his servant were it not for his general employment, the employee as
to such act becomes a servant of the temporary employer."30 In this
way, the problem of determining whether an individual is a "loaned
employee" covered by the compensation act is the equivalent of ask-
ing whether he would be regarded as an employee of the special em-
ployer if there were no general employment, and the decisions on the
existence of the employment relation become relevant.
3. Minors.-Under a 1961 amendment to the act, minors are in-
cluded within the term "employee" even though their employment is
unlawful because of child labor statutes.31 Prior to the passage of this
act, minors illegally employed without permits were held to be able
to elect whether they would bring action under the compensation
act or in tort.3 In the usual case, the minor desired not to be covered,
since he could recover more in a tort action than under the compensa-
tion statute.
4. Partners and Joint Venturers.-In two cases, the Tennessee
court has held members of partnerships not to be employees.3 The
27. See 1 LAMsON § 48.40.
28. Cradic v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra note 24, at 591. The defect in the test
is that it is of little help in the difficult cases in which the business of both masters is
being done. This is the case, for instance, in which the general master is in the busi-
ness of renting machinery with operators to other businesses.
29. Owen v. St. Louis Spring Co., supra note 24, at 548-49, 136 S.W.2d at 500.
30. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), AGENCY § 227, comment d (1958).
31. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1961, ch. 184, § 1, codified in TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-902(b)
(Supp. 1963).
32. See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. City of Clarksville, 204 Tenn. 67, 315 S.W.2d
509 (1958). The election existed on the theory that the contract of employment is
voidable, rather than void, at the election of the minor. See STONE & WmLiAMs,
TE'NESSEE Woi mEN's COmPENSATION §§ 66-67 (1957) (now out of date).
33. Tidwell v. Walden, 205 Tenn. 705, 330 S.W.2d 317 (1959); Gebers v. Murfrees-
boro Laundry Co., 159 Tenn. 51, 15 S.W.2d 737 (1929). The relationship in Tidwell
may not have been a partnership in the traditional sense, but, if not, was a joint
venture to which the same reasoning would apply. The fact statement is not detailed
enough to be certain concerning the precise relation.
1963 ] 1129
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basis for such holdings is the aggregate theory of partnerships accord-
ing to which each partner is viewed as having rights of control and
therefore generally not subject to the control of other partners. The
holdings in both these cases seem correct, for in each instance the
claimant partner apparently did possess an appreciable amount of
control. It is possible, however, for members of a partnership to dele-
gate rights of management and control to less than all partners. 34 In
such an instance, a partnership becomes more like an impersonal entity
and it would seem theoretically possible that in such a case a partner
who by agreement had in fact given up management rights might be
regarded as an "employee,"- although the general trend of decisions
in this country is to the contrary.36
B. Those Electing Not To Be Covered
The Tennessee statute is of the "elective" type. Employers of more
than five persons and their employees are presumed to have elected
to be covered, but may elect not to be covered.37 Section 50-904 of
the Tennessee Code Annotated prescribes the manner in which such
an election shall be made.38 If both employer and employee elect not
to be covered, an injured employee's action against the employer is
governed by common law and the usual defenses are available to
the employer.39 The same result applies if the employee alone elects
not to be covered.40 If the employer elects not to be covered, an in-
jured employee may bring a tort action and the employer cannot make
use of the defenses of assumption of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and
contributory negligence.4' Under section 50-1206, if the employer fails
to comply with the requirements of the workmen's compensation act
relating to insurance and financial responsibility, but has not filed for-
mal notice of election not to be covered, an injured employee may
elect whether to seek benefits under the compensation act or to sue
34. See CRANE, PARTNEnsa, § 14, at 63 n.1 (2d ed. 1952).
35. This would seem in accordance with the purpose of compensation, since a partner
without management rights might well be unable to protect himself against serious loss
from industrial injury. The Tidwell case would seem to underscore this inability, for
the claimant's decedent's economic position was not strong. However, it has been said
that it is theoretically impossible for a partner to be an employee. Cook v. Lauten, 335
Ill. App. 92, 80 N.E.2d 280 (1948).
36. 1 LAsoN § 54.30.
37. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-903 (1956).
38. The employer must post notices of the election in his shop; the employee must
give written notice to his employer. Each must file a duplicate copy with the state
office. Sample forms may be found in STONE & WIuAAms, TENNFSSEn WonhinmN's
CoMwEIsAroN §§ 9, 12 (1957).
39. TEN. CODE ANN. § 50-913 (1956).
40. TEN. CODE Ar. § 50-912 (1956).
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-911 (1956); of. 4 VmND. L. 1Ev. 713 (1951).
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in tort. If he sues in tort, the employer may not use the three defenses
listed above.42
In Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co. v Phillips,3 the defendant em-
ployer had posted notices in the plant to the effect that he elected not
to be covered, but failed to file a duplicate notice with the division of
workmen's compensation as required by section 50-904. Later an em-
ployee was injured and sued the employer in tort. The employer de-
fended on the ground that since he had not filed proper notice the
compensation act still applied to him and the tort action was therefore
barred by the act's exclusive remedy provision. It was held that the
employer was estopped from making use of the exclusive remedy pro-
visions under these facts, and would be treated as if he had filed the
notice properly. Since estoppel was the basis of the decision, it would
seem that the employee could have proceeded under the compensa-
tion act instead. Such a decision is undoubtedly correct as an inter-
pretation of the statute's intent, for it accomplishes virtually the same
result as section 50-1206 of the code, discussed in the preceding para-
graph.
C. Statutory Employers
Under section 50-915 of the code a principal or intermediate or
subcontractor is made liable as an employer under the compensation
act to any employee "injured while in the employ of any of his sub-
contractors and engaged upon the subject matter of the contract .... "
Provisions are made for subrogation to the rights of the employee when
a secondarily liable statutory employer is required to pay. The rela-
tions resulting from these provisions can be quite complex. Since they
are discussed in some detail elsewhere in this issue,44 no further com-
mentary on them will be offered here.
Under section 50-902(a), an employer's insurer is considered an
"employer" under the act. The effect of this is to make the insurer
primarily liable to the injured employee.4 5 In the Kirkland case,46 the
statute of limitations had run as against the actual employer, but not
as against the insurer. When the insurer argued that its liability was
purely derivative so that any defense available to the insured em-
ployer would be available to it, the court relied on 50-902(a) to hold
42. Schroader v. Rural Educ. Ass'n, 33 Tenn. App. 36, 228 S.W.2d 491 (M.S. 1950).
43. 22 Tenn. App. 206, 120 S.W.2d 973 (E.S. 1938).
44. Harbison, Third-Party Liability and Adjustments Between Different Employers
and Insurance Carriers in Tennessee, 16 VAND. L. REv. 1113 (1963).
45. T. H. Mastin & Co. v. Loveday, 202 Tenn. 589, 308 S.W.2d 385 (1957) (injured
claimant may sue insurer in county of his residence if service can be obtained; the
employer need not be joined).




to the contrary. In the concluding paragraphs of the opinion it was
stated that "the employer and insurer are each principals and are
jointly and severally liable to the employee."47 The decision does not,
of course, mean either that the insurer and the employee are to be re-
garded as in privity, or that the insurer is deprived of any of the
substantive defenses available to the actual employer.48
D. Inclusions, Exclusions, and Elections Under Section 50-906
The principal exclusions from coverage are those listed in section
50-906: carriers engaged in interstate commerce; casual employment;
domestic and agricultural labor; employment involving less than five
persons; employees of state and local governments. In the last two in-
stances, the statute specifically states that the parties can elect to come
under the provisions of the act if they so desire.
1. Carriers in Interstate Commerce.-Subsection (a) of section 50-
906 exempts common carriers doing an interstate business while act-
ually engaged in interstate commerce, provided that the business is one
whose employees already have the benefit of a federal employer's lia-
bility act or compensation statute. Thus the exemption in general is
defined by the breadth of federal legislation, covering all those em-
ployees of carriers who are unable to take benefit of the federal law.
While the court did not state it explicitly, the opinion in Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Potts49 indicates that the court will avoid construing
coverage under workmen's compensation to duplicate coverage under
the Federal Employer's Liability Act and related legislation.
2. Employers of Less Than Five Persons.-The exemption of small
employers has caused little controversy in the cases. The only recent
decision of any interest is Commercial Insurance Co. v. Young. 0 In
that case defendant employer had in his service only three persons
and so was not covered by the compensation act. He decided, how-
ever, to elect coverage, and with this in mind he procured a com-
pensation insurance policy from defendant insurer, and paid the first
premium. The employer had not, however, filed the formal notice of
election of coverage with the workmen's compensation division more
than thirty days prior to the occurrence resulting in claimant's injury.
The defendant employer filed notice of the accident with the compen-
47. Id. at 51, 356 S.W.2d at 288.
48. An injured employee is not entitled to obtain one judgment against his employer
and a separate judgment for a different amount against the insurer. Bituminous Cas.
Corp. v. Smith, 200 Tenn. 13, 22-23, 288 S.W.2d 913, 917 (1956).
49. 178 Tenn. 425, 158 S.W.2d 729 (1942) (fireman who could recover under FELA
denied recovery for injury resulting from accident while doing intrastate work).
50. 209 Tenn. 608, 354 S.W.2d 779 (1961).
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sation division and proceeded on the theory that the claimant was
covered. Defendant insurer, on the other hand, resisted payment of
any benefits on the grounds that the employer was not subject to
coverage, since he had neglected to ifie proper notice. It was held by
the supreme court that the provisions allowing election of coverage to
be accomplished by notice are not exclusive, and that defendant
employer had done enough to elect coverage under the act by taking
out the policy and paying the premium. Thus the court indicated that
though an employee who would not be covered under the act but for
an affirmative election of coverage by the employer has the burden of
proving such election,51 the court will be liberal in admitting evidence
tending to show the election and will not require even substantial
compliance with the statutory notice procedures.
3. Government Employees.-Federal employees are never covered
by state compensation laws. They have their own questionably effec-
tive federal act.52 Employees of state, county, and municipal govern-
ments may be covered under the state act if their employer so elects.
The case of Travelers Insurance Co. v. Dudley 3 is almost a twin of
the Young case discussed above. The city of Dyersburg had for years
maintained a compensation insurance policy with defendant insurer,
covering its municipal employees, but had failed to file proper notice.
When a claim was brought under the policy the insurer defended on
the grounds of sovereign immunity and failure to elect coverage. The
court held the insurer to be estopped from asserting either defense,
since it had taken premiums and adjusted small claims for years, thus
inducing the municipality to maintain the policy for the benefit of its
employees.
One alarming decision now three decades old deserves mention if
only because hopefully it can be buried. In Cornet v. City of Chat-
tanooga4 it was held that a city which had elected coverage for its
employees could nonetheless resist the claim of a policeman under the
compensation act on the ground that a policeman was a governmental
"officer" rather than an "employee" because his rights and duties were
defined by statute and ordinance rather than by a contract of hire.
No argument of estoppel against the insurer was apparently made
51. Id. at 629, 354 S.W.2d at 778.
52. The basic structure of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act is discussed in
Small, The General Structure of Law Applicable to Employee Injury and Death, 16
VAND. L. REv. 1021, 1033 (1963). The act has not had the general reputation of
being adequate and effective, but other fringe benefits of federal employees, such as
health and disability insurance plans, have been so liberal that pressure for improve-
ment of FECA has been negligible.
53. 180 Tenn. 191, 173 S.W.2d 142 (1943).
54. 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742 (1933).
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out. In the more recent case of Woods v. City of LaFollette,55 an in-
surer attempted to rely on Cornet after having issued a policy whose
premium schedule included an entry for policemen. Since the injured
policeman had been told of the existence of the compensation insur-
ance, an argument of estoppel could be made out against the insurer,
and the claimant was permitted to recover. In the opinion, the court
discussed Cornet at some length, distinguishing it on the ground that
the insurance contract in Cornet contained terms "in part made up
of the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state. If parties choose
to enlarge the terms of the contract so as to include policemen they
have a legal right to do so."56 In Woods it was decided the parties had
included policemen in the policy and that the insurer was therefore
estopped from regarding policemen as employees. The reasoning is
unworthy of the court. If the reason the claimant in Cornet was denied
relief was that he was not an employee within the meaning of the act,
then the claimant in Woods was in no better position. The benefits
of the act accrue to "employees" and only to "employees" within the
terms of the act; if an individual is not an employee he has no stand-
ing to bring an action under the law, and it is questionable whether
he should be allowed to acquire employee status by any principle of
estoppel. This is a very different use of estoppel from that in the
Dudley case discussed in the preceding paragraph. There the insurer
was held estopped to deny that an election of coverage, clearly pos-
sible under the statute, had been made. In Woods the insurer was held
estopped to deny that the policy covered an individual who, accord-
ing to the Cornet decision, could not be covered as a matter of law.
The decision in Cornet was well written and fluent; it was nonethe-
less wrong. It carried over from another area of law a distinction be-
tween employee and officer that has no relevance for compensation
law. The case should be flatly overruled, so that in future situations
courts, counsel, and claimants will not have to avoid the injustice of
its application by a questionable resort to principles of estoppel.51
55. 185 Tenn. 655, 207 S.W.2d 572 (1947).
56. Id. at 661, 207 S.W.2d at 574.
57. At the risk of being unduly repetitious it should be emphasized that the writer
does not mean estoppel was wrongly applied in Woods. The argument is that the
use of estoppel is debatable when a mistake of law is involved, as revealed by the
divergence of opinions on cases of this sort. See PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE
LAiw 502, 520 (2d ed. 1957). Moreover, it is an invitation to the drawing of unduly
fine distinctions between the rights of similarly situated parties. See 7A APPLEAAN, IN-
SURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4645 (1962), for illustrations of this. Let us suppose,
for instance, that the policeman in Woods had not been told of the insurance. Should
he then be denied recovery since he would not have "relied" on its existence? The
possibility of such an argument reveals how slender a reed estoppel may be in these
cases. A fiat overruling of Cornet would have had the advantage of greater certainty
and clarity.
1134 [ VOL. 16
COVERED EMPLOYMENT
4. Casual Employment.-Section 50-906(b) excludes "any person
whose employment at the time of injury is casual, that is, one who is
not employed in the usual course of trade, business, profession or oc-
cupation of the employer." This provision is somewhat different from
that of most states; the more usual wordings are "casual and not in the
usual course" or "casual or not in the usual course." 8 Tennessee's stat-
ute makes "casual" and "not... in the usual course of trade" synony-
mous. Under this provision the problem is not the frequency with
which the employee is in the service of the employer, but the regu-
larity of the employer's participation in the type of business activity
for which the employee was hired.59 The cases applying this subsection
have usually involved employees engaged in activities which might
be regarded as "sidelines" for their employers. The approach of the
court has been to determine (1) whether the sideline activity has
been engaged in to such an extent by the employer that he is actually
in two businesses, or (2) whether the activity, though peripheral, is
so closely related to the employer's principal business that it may be
regarded as an incident of that business.
Two relatively recent cases illustrate this two-pronged approach. In
Mason-Dixon Lines v. Lett,60 the plaintiff's decedent was not employed
in decedents main line of business-trucking-but in maintenance of
a commercial resort operated as a sideline activity by defendant. The
court found that the resort had been operated by defendant with
sufficient regularity that it was part of defendant's regular business
activities. In Smith v. Lincoln Memorial University,61 claimant was a
member of a summer painting crew refurbishing buildings on the cam-
pus. Granting that painting is not a part of the educational process
that is the main function of a university, the court went on to point
out that maintenance of this sort is essential to the carrying on of the
university's educational program. Therefore claimant was not a casual
employee.
62
5. Domestic Servants and Farm Employees.-Section 50-906(c)
excludes domestic servants and farm employees from coverage.
There have been relatively few cases interpreting the provision, but
those indicate that the agricultural exemption is quite broad, extend-
58. A discussion of these provisions appears in 1 LARSON § 51. In spite of the
different wording of the Tennessee statute, the results in the cases do not seem very
different from those arrived at under the more usual phrasings.
59. Mason-Dixon Lines v. Lett, 201 Tenn. 171, 177-78, 297 S.W.2d 93, 96 (1956).
60. Supra note 59.
61. 202 Tenn. 238, 304 S.W.2d 70 (1957).
62. "Behind all these decisions lies one simple thought: maintenance, repair, painting,
cleaning and the like are 'in the course' of business because the business could not be
carried on without them, and because they are an expectable, routine and inherent part
of carrying on any enterprise." 1 LARSON § 51.23, at 765.
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ing so far as to exclude workers in commercial nurseries. This sub-
section does not include a provision for affirmative elective coverage,
as do the subsections excluding employers of fewer than five persons
and governmental units. Nonetheless, in Eidson v. Hardware Mutual
Casualty Co.,6 3 the supreme court held that an agricultural employee
could bring an action on a compensation policy taken out by his em-
ployer since the premiums paid by the employer were based in part on
the wages paid to this and other farm employees. The court cited its
earlier decision, Woods v. City of LaFollette,6 for authority. The
Woods case was based on estoppel. The court's statement of the
theory of the Eidson decision is this:
In the present case, both the employer and the employee are insisting
that the insurance was under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and since
the employer is not a party defendant, it is only the Insurance Company that
is resisting that conclusion. We see no valid reason why, when an insurance
carrier insures an employer and the policy expressly covers farm employees,
... that the Insurance Company should not be held to comply with its con-
tract. It is not necessary for us to decide on this record whether the taking
out of insurance by the employer, without the knowledge of the employee,
had the effect of placing the employment contract under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.65
Under this decision the Cornet-Woods distinction between estoppel
and nonestoppel situations is carried over to categories of employment
excluded under the statute without provision for elective coverage.
If an employer chooses to take out insurance on any category of ex-
cluded employee he may do so and thereby provide benefits for these
employees, whether the statute explicitly provides for elective cover-
age or not. The propriety of so broad an expansion of protection under
the act is fairly debatable. 66 For the court to say that the employee is
not receiving benefits under the statute but under the insurance con-
tract is unrealistic, for it neglects the fact that by its terms a work-
men's compensation insurance policy measures the insurer's liability
by the terms of the statute.6 7 However, the legislature has left Eidson
and similar decisions undisturbed and this may be regarded as ac-
cepted law in Tennessee.
6. Charitable Employees.-In Smith v. Lincoln Memorial Univer-
sity,68 the defendant college argued that its employees were excluded
63. 191 Tenn. 430, 234 S.W.2d 836 (1950) (Neil, C.J., dissenting).
64. See the discussion of Woods and Cornet, supra p. 1133-34.
65. 191 Tenn. at 438-39, 234 S.W.2d at 840.
66. Jurisdictions have differed on the proper result. See Annot., 103 A.L.R. 1523
(1936).
67. For instance, one would suppose a claimant in the position of the claimant in
Eidson would be given the benefit of the recent increases in benefits provided by statute.
68. 202 Tenn. 238, 304 S.W.2d 70 (1957).
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from the act because the employer was an eleemosynary institution.
The court held that such institutions are not exempt from liability un-
der the compensation act, since they would fall within the general
definition of employer given in section 50-902(a) and are not specifi-
cally excluded under section 50-906. The decision is a fair construction
of the act, applying the familiar rule expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, and is in accord with a majority of holdings from other juris-
dictions.69
III. Tim CONCEPT OF COTENNSABLE INJURY
The remainder of this brief article is concerned with the concept of
compensable injury. The definition of injury given in section 50-
902(d) is:
any injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and
shall include certain occupational diseases arising out of and in the course
of employment which cause either disablement or death of the employee
resulting from the occupational diseases named in section 50-1101.
There are several elements in this apparently simple definition. There
must be an injury; it must be by accident or result from an occupa-
tional disease; it must arise out of the employment; and it must arise
in the course of employment. These elements normally receive in-
dependent consideration in the cases, but the overall purpose of all
the elements is similar: to require that an injury be connected with
employment to be compensable under the compensation act. It has
been forcefully argued by Professor Larson 7° and others71 that this
is true in regard to the "arising out of" and "in the course of" require-
ments. Very nearly the same argument can be made concerning the
requirement of "accident." The most obvious case of employment
connection is surely that in which there is a recognizable trauma with-
in the employment context. The least obvious is the situation in which
a generalized condition has resulted from prolonged exposure to a
hazardous condition. Lung trouble in a miner, for instance, may be the
result both of fumes inhaled during working hours and of excessive
smoking off the job.
Therefore, it is submitted that all the elements of the definition are
oriented toward the one requirement of employment connection. This
requirement is both a liberalizing provision (since it is less restrictive
than the proximate cause requirements of tort law) and a restrictive
provision (since it does limit the coverage of the statute to the em-
69. See I LARSON § 50.40.
70. 1 LARSON § 29.00.
71. See, e.g., Malone, Some Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Work-
men's Compensation, 16 VAN.D L. REv. 1039, 1046-47 (1963).
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ployment situation, so that compensation does not act as social in-
surance). The definition is thus a compromise, and as is usually the
case with compromise provisions, there is an internal tension within
the section that plagues decision makers who must attempt to achieve
a just and fair balance between the liberalizing and restrictive ele-
ments. It can fairly be said that the Tennessee courts have done well
in this balancing of elements. While there are inconsistencies and
unfortunate language here and there, the cases which will be taken
up in the ensuing pages are for the most part reconcilable in theory
and fair in result.
IV. "INiJURY"
A. General Definition
What is an injury? The controlling definition in recent cases is
surely that adopted by the court (from a Massachusetts decision) in
its 1961 decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed:72 "In common speech
the word 'injury' as applied to a personal injury to a human being,
includes whatever lesion or change in any part of the system produces
harm or pain or lessened facility of the natural use of any bodily
activity or capability."73 Note the elements of the definition: There
must be a lesion or change in the system, i.e., there must be an ob-
servable difference between the condition of the claimant as a func-
tioning human being before the occurrence and after the occurrence
of the injury. And there must be harm, pain, or lessened facility; in
terms of the compensation act one would suppose that this could be
summarized by saying that the injury must cause the claimant to be
less marketable as a worker.7 4 This definition of injury is obviously a
flexible and adaptable one; one feels confident in predicting it will re-
main a satisfactory general guide for many years. With it in mind, let
us turn to certain specific types of injury which have caused the courts
some difficulty.
B. Aggravation of Pre-existing Ailments
"Injury" includes aggravation of ills which an employee already has,
even though the original malady may not have been compensable.
The Friddell case "5 involved an employee with a diseased appendix.
72. 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65 (1961), 29 TENN. L. RFv. 477 (1962).
73. Id. at 113, 350 S.W.2d at 68.
74. Zeigal's Case, 325 Mass. 128, 89 N.E.2d 264, 265 (1949): "Compensation is
awarded not for the injury as such but rather for an impairment of earning capacity
caused by the injury."
75. Great American Indem. Co. v. Friddell, 198 Tenn. 360, 280 S.W.2d 908 (1955);
see also Eslinger v. Miller Bros., 203 Tenn. 688, 315 S.W.2d 261 (1958) (aggravation
of arteriosclerosis).
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After he fell from a ladder at work, the condition degenerated and
eventually the appendix ruptured. Compensation was allowed. In two
1962 decisions,. 6 employees with imperfect backs were held to be
injured when their back conditions became aggravated because of
work. The reasoning of all three cases appears sound. In each instance,
there was a change for the worse in the employee's condition-not
much of a change, perhaps, but a change. And before this change
the employees, even though medically disabled, were able to work;
after the aggravation of their disabilities they could no longer do so.
Kellon v. American Bakeries Co.,"" also decided in 1962, appears at
first blush to be contrary to these decisions. In that case the claimant
was a young man with a congenital back defect. From the facts given
in the opinion, it seems that he was discharged from the Navy on
account of it and that he had back trouble with some regularity.
While working for defendant, he one day felt an unusually sharp pain
in the lower back while lifting a tray. After staying away from work
for a week (presumably because of the back trouble) he came back
to the job and remained with it until discharged for poor quality of
service. A week or so later, the back pain became severe and after
medical consultation claimant brought a compensation action for
disability resulting from aggravation of his condition. The court held
that he had sustained no injury. The opinion does not spell the reasons
out in full, but apparently the court felt that claimant's pain was not
due to any change in the back, but simply to the fact that his back
was medically imperfect. In other words, he was the possessor of a
back as saleable on the labor market before the tray-lifting as after
it. Thus, while it is possible to disagree with the decision on the facts,
it is reconcilable with the general theory enunciated in Brown Shoe.
There may have been a lesion or change in the back (although the
court does not concede this) but it did not result in harm in the sense
of the compensation act.
C. Mental Ailments
The word injury is "broader than the mere reference to some objec-
tive physical break or wound to the body and includes the conse-
quences therefrom such as mental ailments or nervous conditions."
78
Necessarily so, one would think, for were mental conditions not to be
covered, the courts would be faced with the extremely difficult prob-
76. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Baxter, 210 Tenn. 242, 357 S.W.2d 825 (1962)
(the discussion of this point might arguably be dictum); Combustion Eng'r Co. v.
Blanks, 210 Tenn. 233, 357 S.W.2d 625 (1962) (tuberculosis of back).
77. 210 Tenn. 184, 357 S.W.2d 56 (1962).
78. Buck & Simmons Auto & Elec. Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn. 115, 119, 250
S.W.2d 39, 40-41 (1952).
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lem of differentiating between the harm done by an accident to a
man's physical structure and the harm done to his mental system.
The symptoms of the two types of injury are sometimes nearly identi-
cal. For example, consider the case of Bush Brothers v. Williams, " in
which the claimant suffered from severe pains in the back and legs
and was unable to do any work requiring bending or stooping. Medi-
cal testimony confirmed the reality of this disability, even though
x-rays and other tests did not show (and perhaps could not be expected
to show) a ruptured disc to account for the pain. If mental and nervous
injury were not covered by the Tennessee act, a complex situation
would result in which such cases might be defended on the ground
that the injury was actually mental rather than physical.
Two decisions within the last decade have recognized the propriety
of allowing recovery for traumatic and post-traumatic neurosis, reject-
ing the argument that such a condition is a "disease" and is not covered
under the act because it is not listed in the occupational disease see-
tion.80 Both cases also underscore the importance of medical testimony
establishing the reality of the neurosis. It is hardly surprising that the
court should expect a considerable body of proof, since in such cases
there is a distinct possibility of malingering.
D. Subsequent Consequential Injury
Subsequent consequences cases are no great problem if the conse-
quential harm can be demonstrated to be closely enough related to
the original work-connected injury. Mallette v. Mercury Outboard
Supply Co."' illustrates one of the more common situations, aggravation
by negligence of a hospital employee. The claimant's back was in-
jured in a fall. While he was recuperating in a hospital, an orderly who
was bathing him negligently aggravated the back injury. In such a
case the relation between the original work-connected harm and the
later injury is clear and the court had no difficulty in holding for the
claimant. The same result follows even more clearly when the aggra-
vation results from the treatment of an attending physician. 82
In DuPont v. Kessler,3 the facts were just enough different to call
79. 197 Tenn. 334, 273 S.W.2d 137 (1954).
80. McKenzie v. Campbell & Dan Mfg. Co., 209 Tenn. 475, 354 S.W.2d 440 (1962);
Buck & Simmons Auto & Elec. Supply Co. v. Kesterson, supra note 78.
81. 204 Tenn. 438, 321 S.W.2d 816 (1959).
82. Whitaker v. Morton Frozen Foods, Inc., 201 Tenn. 425, 300 S.W.2d 610 (1957)
(operation for hand injury limited claimant's ability to grip); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Roberts, 198 Tenn. 386, 280 S.W.2d 918 (1955) (use of stainless steel wire to sew
up incision prevented claimant from performing manual labor). But see McCarty v.
Musgrave Pencil Co., 199 Tenn. 582, 288 S.W.2d 444 (1955) (failure to give proper
notice made hernia non-compensable; resulting heart attack held non-compensable also).
83. 208 Tenn. 224, 345 S.W.2d 663 (1961).
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for an opposite result. Claimant suffered from mitral stenosis, a pro-
gressive heart ailment caused by rheumatic fever in childhood. At
work one day, claimant experienced a brief but very painful edema
attack. Because of the attack, claimant was taken to a hospital for
treatment. There, doctors decided to try an operation to improve
claimant's general heart condition. The operation was a failure and
probably left the claimant in worse shape than before. The supreme
court held that any aggravation caused by the operation was not com-
pensable, since the operation was aimed at correcting the underlying
condition rather than relieving the pain brought on by edema; the
edema, it was testified, would have cleared up in a matter of hours
without the operation. The decision was obviously a close one. The
mitral stenosis was the true cause of the operation, not the edema;
yet at the same time it is probable the operation would not have been
performed but for the edema attack brought on by overexertion at
work.
Jones v. Huey" illustrates the second type of fact situation in which
benefits are asked for injury subsequent to the original employment
injury: a claimant is hurt because his original injury has left him
unable to function normally. In Jones, the claimant had while working
for defendant sustained a back injury which brought about his dis-
charge. Claimant then obtained a job on a farm. While operating a
tractor there, he was killed, probably due to his inability to operate
the tractor properly with a bad back. The supreme court quite prop-
erly held the decedent's independent decision to seek work on a farm
while admittedly not able to do the work there probably meant that
his later injury was too far removed from the original harm to be com-
pensable.
V. "By ACCIDENT"
The phrase "by accident" has not troubled the Tennessee courts as
much as it has those of some other jurisdictions.8 5 The definition used
by our courts is a common one: "an unloaked for mishap, an untoward
event, which is not expected or designed." 6 It is virtually the same as
the definition of the same word used in insurance policies,8 7 so that
insurance cases may be of some relevance when doing research in
84. 210 Tenn. 162, 357 S.W.2d 47 (1962).
85. See 1 LARSON § 37; 4 SCnsEmiE, WoaxmEN's COMPENSATION TXT § 1240
(1945).
86. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, 209 Tenn. 106, 114, 350 S.W.2d 65, 69 (1961); see
also Sears-Roebuck Co. v. Starnes, 160 Tenn. 504, 26 S.W.2d 128 (1929) (term in-
capable of precise definition).
87. See PATrEsoN, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 243-54 (2d ed. 1957), for a





The states have divided on the effect of adding to the word "acci-
dent" the little preposition "by." Some jurisdictions have held that
this means the cause of the injury must be unlooked for, not just the
injury itself.8 Thus these states have declined to allow compensation
for heart attacks that resulted from the normal work activity of an
employee, since the cause of the attack was not in any way unusual
or untoward. Tennessee, however, has long since refused to attach
any importance to this tenuous distinction. Our courts have allowed
recovery for injuries which resulted from accidental causes-such as
the fall in the Fridell case 9-and for injuries which were unexpected
results of ordinary activities-such as a heart attack caused by the
normal exertion of a milk deliveryman.90 One fairly early decision
under the Tennessee statute offers an interesting comment to the effect
that the words "injury" and "accident" are virtually synonymous for
workmen's compensation law.91
One aspect of the accident requirement does continue to plague
the court: the requirement that the cause or the resulting injury be
fairly traceable to a definite time and place. At one time some courts
enforced this requirement with extreme strictness, but this has been
tempered with the years. In Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed,92 the injury re-
sulted from a series of small repeated traumas: each time claimant
used his left hand to operate a trimming machine a severe strain was
placed on his arm. "This repeated movement, several hundred times
daily, day after day, caused the slipping and irritation of the ulnar
nerve and eventually caused neuritis of the nerve, pain and atrophy."
93
It was held that being able to pin the cause of the atrophy down to this
particular type of repeated strain was sufficient to meet the accident
requirement, possibly on the ground that each repetition was an acci-
dent.
The definiteness requirement is less easily met when there is no
trauma, not even a slight oft-repeated one, to which the injury can
be traced. The greater difficulty can be illustrated by comparing two
88. See, e.g., Wieda v. American Box Board Co., 343 Mich. 182, 72 N.W.2d 13
(1955), which has now been effectively overruled by Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'l Bank,
348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957).
89. Discussed supra at note 75.
90. Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Rychen, 204 Tenn. 575, 322 S.W.2d 432 (1958); see
also Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 174 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Tenn. 1959); Huey
Bros. Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 210 Tenn. 170, 357 S.W.2d 50 (1962); Boyd v. Young, 193
Tenn. 272, 246 S.W.2d 10 (1951).
91. Franse v. Knox Porcelain Corp., 171 Tenn. 49, 100 S.W.2d 647 (1937). The
opposite is said in Pittman v. City Stores, Inc., 204 Tenn. 650, 656, 325 S.W.2d 249
(1958).
92. 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65 (1961).
93. Id. at 114, 350 S.W.2d at 68.
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well-known decisions. Claimant in Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Hay94 worked around a stable and was there exposed to germs
which caused blastomycosis, a rare skin ailment. The insurer defended
in part on the grounds that it was not possible to trace the origin of
the injury to a sufficiently definite time and place because of its non-
traumatic character. The court held that "an accidental injury is not
necessarily of traumatic origin, strictly speaking. If it be an injury
not reasonably to be foreseen, unexpected and fortuitous, it is an acci-
dental injury whether occasioned by heat, germs, or more abrupt or
perceptible physical force."95 Recovery was allowed. Claimant's peti-
tion in Gabbard v. Proctor & Gamble Defense Corp.96 alleged that
claimant had sustained an injury as a result of breathing fumes at
work over a period of eighteen months. The court upheld a judgment
of dismissal on the ground that there was no accidental injury since
no definite time and place could be set for the inception of the ailment.
The court distinguished Hay on the grounds that the onset of the
illness was clearly marked by the scratching of a pimple. The difference
between the two cases, then, is chiefly that the effect of the injury in
the one case became apparent with some suddenness, even though
the cause of the injury could not be pinned down closely, while in the
other case both cause and effect were non-traumatic and gradual.
Why does the court impose the requirement of definiteness in re-
gard to time and place? Professor Larson suggests that "the under-
lying practical reason for insisting on a definite date is that a number
of important questions cannot be answered unless a date ... is fixed,
such as which employer and [sic] carrier is on the risk, whether notice
of injury and claim is within the statutory period, whether statutory
amendments were in effect, which wage basis applies, and many
others."w Among the many others is certainly the problem of deter-
mining whether recovery for a generalized non-traumatic injury should
be sought under the accidental injury or occupational disease provi-
sions.98 As can be seen, these factors relate for the most part to pro-
cedure and pleading. The courts will look askance on a pleading which
does not offer it guidance with which to answer the questions Larson
suggests. Under Brown Shoe Co. a pleading should be sufficient to
avoid this attack if it can show either (1) a single trauma or short
series of traumas which caused the injury, even though the injury may
94. 159 Tenn. 202, 17 S.W.2d 904 (1928).
95. Id. at 208, 17 S.W.2d at 905-06.
96. 185 Tenn. 464, 201 S.W.2d 651 (1947).
97. 1 LAmSON § 39.10, at 568.
98. In Brown Shoe, for instance, one defense entered was that claimant had not
suffered an injury by accident, but had contracted an occupational disease not listed as
compensable by the Tennessee statute. This distinction becomes of less significance, of
course, if coverage of diseases is broadened. See infra p. 1155-57.
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manifest itself gradually;99 or (2) a limited period of exposure to
germs, heat, or the like leading to the injury (certainly less than eight-
een months of breathing);'00 or (3) an injury which, though caused
by a prolonged exposure or repetition of traumas, manifests itself with
sufficient suddenness so that a reasonable employee would give notice
to his employer;' 0 ' or (4) a gradual injury which can be traced to a
single type of movement or activity required by the work and less
generalized than a normal bodily function like breathing.
10 2
VI. "AmsING IN TE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT"
A. The General Problem
The requirement that an injury arise in the course of employment
means simply that it should arise while the employee is where his
employment causes him to be, at a time when he would be considered
by a reasonable man to be at work, and while he is engaged in an
activity at least partly connected with his work. Both this requirement
and the requirement that an injury arise "out of" employment are
designed to insure that the injury is connected with the employment
closely enough to be considered a consequence of the hazard created
by the employment relation. But the two requirements are still
treated by the Tennessee court as nominally independent. As was
said in the Canale case, "arising out of the employment" refers to the
origin of the injury, while "in the course of employment" refers to the
time, place and circumstances.
0 3
Fortunately, most injuries occur while the employee is on the prem-
ises of the employer, during working hours, and while he is engaged
in activity beneficial to the employer. But peripheral cases continue
99. This is the most obvious case, and the most usual. Injuries resulting from falls
are good examples. See, e.g., Pittman v. City Stores, Inc., 204 Tenn. 650, 325 S.W.2d
249 (1958).
100. T. J. Moss Tie Co. v. Rollins, 191 Tenn. 577, 235 S.W.2d 585 (1951) (sun-
stroke); King v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 155 Tenn. 491, 296 S.W. 3 (1927) (heat
prostration).
101. Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, supra note 92.
102. This is the most difficult category, for such injuries are closely akin to occupa-
tional disease. Obviously, general deterioration due to aging as well as to work, is not
compensable. Knight v. Berkline Corp., 210 Tenn. 318, 358 S.W.2d 323 (1962). But
what of an employee who while operating a handsaw is continuously struck lightly in
the chest and who develops pericarditis? In such a case there is gradualness both in
cause and in effect. The Tennessee court allowed recovery, Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v.
Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 222 S.W.2d 22 (1949), on the basis of repeated traumas, each
acting as an additional injury, so that the case would arguably fit the third listed
category, but for the fact that the injury did not manifest itself quite so definitely in
terms of time.
103. McAdams v. Canale, 200 Tenn. 655, 661, 294 S.W.2d 696, 699 (1956); see
also Sandlin v. Gentry, 201 Tenn. 509, 300 S.W.2d 897 (1957).
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to arise, some of them recurring often enough to deserve some mention
here.
B. Problems of Place
In a number of cases, attorneys have attempted to persuade the
Tennessee courts that the "premises" of the employer should be ex-
tended to include adjacent sidewalks, streets, and parking lots com-
monly used by employees while coming to or going from work. 4 In
general, recovery has been denied in such cases, even though the
employer may own the sidewalk or parking lot.'05 Thus, as soon as the
employee steps out the plant door, he is no longer in the course of
his employment. However, there are exceptions. Principally they in-
volve means of ingress and egress, whether owned by the employer
or not, which employees are required or expected to use as the only
practical means of traveling to work, and in connection with which
there is some recognizable hazard. In the Mallette case,1 6 for example,
an employee was allowed to recover for injuries received from a fall
on a steep flight of steps leading from the bank of a lake to the em-
ployer's marina, since there was no other way of getting to the
marina."7
Employees other than traveling employees are not considered to be
within the course of employment while on the highways going to and
from work except in particular circumstances. The circumstances that
do call for coverage occur when the employer has control over, or is
interested in, the time and manner of transport. Thus, employees
injured while being transported to work in an employer's truck are
entitled to compensation, since the employer controlled the journey.0 8
In Tallent v. M. C. Lyle & Son,109 a workman had, at his employer's
urging, made arrangements to carry a number of his co-workers back
104. This approach has been described as the "so close" rule. It obviously raises the
question: "How close is so close?" See Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1395 (1945) (parking lots).
105. James v. Sanders Mfg. Co., 203 Tenn. 274, 310 S.W.2d 466 (1958) (sidewalk);
Bennett v. Vanderbilt Univ., 198 Tenn. 1, 277 S.W.2d 386 (1955) (parking lot); Smith
v. Camel Mfg. Co., 192 Tenn. 670, 241 S.W.2d 771 (1951) (sidewalk some 6 to 20
feet from factory door). While these cases evoke considerable sympathy, the court has
probably done well to maintain a strict attitude. The "so close" view is fraught with
uncertainty. See the argument in 1 LARSON § 15.22.
106. Mallette v. Mercury Outboard Supply Co., 204 Tenn. 438, 321 S.W.2d 816
(1959).
107. See a]so Moore v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.R.R.R., 148 Tenn. 561, 256 S.W. 876
(1923) (employees used hazardous route leaving railroad yards); Patten Hotel Co. v.
Milner, 145 Tenn. 632, 238 S.W. 75 (1921) (employees habitually used adjoining alley
for rest breaks with encouragement of employer); Washington County v. Evans, 156
Tenn. 197, 299 S.W. 780 (1927) (road construction worker still "on premises" after
leaving work site proper while on portion of uncompleted road).
108. Vaughn v. Standard Sur. & Cas. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 671, 184 S.W.2d 556 (M.S.
1944).
109. 187 Tenn. 482, 216 S.W.2d 7 (1948).
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and forth to the job. One afternoon when he left the work site to go
get his car started, it would not operate properly. While trying to get
the car running, the employee injured his hand. He brought a claim
for compensation. The court held the claimant to have been within
the course of his employment, since in a number of ways (such as
carrying employees to the claimant's car at quitting time in a company
car) the employer had indicated he was interested in the transporta-
tion arrangement.
Employees hired to travel, such as traveling salesmen, are a category
apart. Gregory v. Porter enunciated the general rule that "when the
duties of an employee require travel, injuries received as a result of
such hazards incident to such travel are compensable."" 0 Thus from
the time a traveling employee leaves his home to go on a business trip
until he returns home he is within his scope of employment so long as
he remains on the employment route, even while he is resting and
eating. Only when he leaves the employment route to deviate on a
personal errand is he not covered."' And if he returns to the employ-
ment route after having deviated, he is back within the scope of
employment again." 2
A dual purpose trip is just what the name implies: a trip taken
partly for business purposes and partly for personal reasons. The Ten-
nessee court has adopted the doctrine of Marks v. Gray13 to determine
whether an employee is within the course of his employment on such
trips." 4 Under this doctrine, "'if the business of the master creates the
necessity for the travel, the servant is in the course of his employment
although he is furthering at the same time some purpose of his own.' "
To phrase it another way: If the business purpose of the trip is at
least a concurrent motivation of the trip, the journey will be considered
a business trip. If the business motive is only a subordinate cause for
the journey, the employee will be considered at work only when he is
actually at the particular place required by the business. The rest of
his journey is considered personal."
6
110. 204 Tenn. 582, 585, 322 S.W.2d 591, 592 (1959).
111. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dedmon, 196 Tenn. 94, 264 S.W.2d 567 (1951)
(employee not covered while engaged in personal shopping excursion during business
trip); see also Timmerman v. Kerr Glass Mfg. Co., 203 Tenn. 543, 314 S.W.2d 31
(1958) (deviation not covered even though with employer's consent).
112. Martin v. Free Serv. Tire Co., 189 Tenn. 327, 22.5 S.W.2d 249 (1949); West
Tenn. Nix-A-Mite Sys., Inc. v. Funderburk, 208 Tenn. 381, 346 S.W.2d 250 (1961).
113. 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929).
114. Patton v. L. 0. Brayton & Co., 184 Tenn. 592, 201 S.W.2d 981 (1947).
115. Id. at 597, 201 S.W.2d at 984.
116. The business purpose need not be dominant, as some courts have unfortunately
stated. 1 LARsON § 18.20.
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C. Problems of Time
Tennessee decisions on what constitute working hours are fairly
routine. It has been held that lunch hours and rest breaks are work
time when employees remain on the employer's premises in a lunch-
room or snack bar operated by the employer." 7 In one case it was held
that restaurant employees who stepped out of the kitchen into an
adjoining open space for their rest breaks to get away from the heat
were still in the course of employment, since the employer knew and
approved of the practice." 8 On the other hand, an employee who goes
out to eat supper at a private restaurant is not within the scope of
employment while off the premises, even though the employer reim-
burses the cost of the meal."
9
In City of Gallatin v. Anderson,u20 an off-duty policeman was in-
jured when he made an arrest for an offense committed in his presence.
The court held that since the policeman was on call twenty-four hours
a day for this sort of purpose, he was at work while making the arrest.
Presumably the same rationale should apply to other on-call em-
ployees.
11
D. Problems of Activity
What activities are within the scope of employment? First, it is
clear that any activity required by the employer under the contract
of hire is in the scope of employment, even though it may not be of
direct business benefit. In the Canale case,' 2 the contract of hire con-
templated that the claimant would not only act as a secretary and
bookkeeper, but that she would from time to time serve as her
employer's driver because his ability to operate an automobile had
been restricted by an accident. Claimant was injured while driving the
employer on a trip whose purpose was personal to the employer. The
court stated that "where, as here, the employee is doing what he or
she is directed to do by the employer. . it seems reasonable that an
injury which arose during the course of this employment that the
employee was directed to do should be compensable."M
Second, it would seem clear that any activity which may be regarded
as reasonably or normally incidental to working is within the course
117. Kaylor v. Magill, 181 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1950); Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, 161
Tenn. 470, 33 S.W.2d 90 (1930).
118. Patten Hotel Co. v. Milner, supra note 107.
119. Greenfield v. Manufacturers Cas. Co., 198 Tenn. 452, 281 S.W.2d 47 (1955).
120. 209 Tenn. 392, 354 S.W.2d 84 (1962).
121. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dedmon, 196 Tenn. 94, 264 S.W.2d 567
(1951) (semble); 1 LAIusoN § 24.20.
122. McAdams v. Canale, 200 Tenn. 655, 294 S.W.2d 696 (1956).
123. Id. at 662, 294 S.W.2d at 699; see 1 LARsoN § 27.40. As to the converse-
forbidden activities-see infra at 1151.
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of employment if engaged in within the employment context. In this
category would fall such activities as eating,12 rest breaks,'21 horseplay,
and the like.12' While an employee may not in the strict sense be
"working" at such moments, he would be thought of in common
parlance as being "at work." The principal limitation on this category
is that the activity take place within the employment context. It is
necessary for an employee to eat in order to work, but his eating will
not be regarded as a work activity unless it is done under the control
or at the direction of the employer, e.g., in a company lunchroom or,
in the case of a traveling employee, along the employment route.
Third, an activity other than normal work sponsored by the em-
ployer may be within the course of employment if the employer di-
rects, strongly encourages, or actively participates in the activity.
There is little authority in Tennessee for this category, although it has
been frequently discussed elsewhere.1 7 However, an early Tennessee
case intimated that employees playing basketball on a court provided
by their employer were probably in the course of employment' 28 so
that it appears likely the Tennessee courts will extend coverage to
these activities when confronted by a proper case. The problem, of
course, is whether the employer has been active enough in his spon-
sorship or encouragement of the activity so that it can fairly be said
that the activity is an incident of being an employee. 9
Fourth, acts done by an employee in an emergency are within the
scope of employment if the emergency arises in the course of the
employer's business and if the employee's acts are reasonable in light
of the necessities of the situation. In the Dudley case, 130 a city water
department employee was pressed into service in aid of firemen, and
while so aiding them was killed. It was held that his acts were a
reasonable response to an employment emergency and thus covered
under the act.
E. The Importance of "Arising"
The requirement of the statute is that an injury arise in the course
of employment, not that it manifest itself then. A particularly stressful
and tense day at work may well bring on a heart attack which does
not take place until the worker has arrived at home. Nonetheless, if
the origin of the attack can be traced to the work situation, it is com-
124. Kaylor v. Magill, supra note 117.
125. Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, supra note 117.
126. Ransom v. H. G. Hill Co., 205 Tenn. 377, 326 S.W.2d 659 (1959).
127. See 1 LASON §§ 22.00, 27.00.
128. Kingsport Silk Mills v. Cox, supra note 117, at 474, 33 S.W.2d at 91.
129. See, e.g., Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 6 Ill. 2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699
(1955) (industrial league softball competition).
130. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Dudley, 180 Tenn. 191, 173'S.W.2d 142 (1943).
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pensable.1 31 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Tennessee,
like many other states, has been reluctant to allow compensation in
such cases unless the evidence offered by the claimant is more than
usually convincing.' 32 Attorneys involved in such cases should take
particular care in the preparation and presentation of medical evidence
of causation.
VII. "ARiNc OuT OF EMPLOYMENT"
A. Basic Theories of Causation
There are three general rules or theories of causationas which have
been urged in compensation cases: proximate cause, added peril, and
131. See, e.g., Howell v. Charles H. Bacon Co., 98 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Tenn. 1951),
aff'd, 197 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1952); see also the materials on consequential injuries,
supra p. 1140-41.
132. See, e.g., Hagewood v. DuPont, 206 Tenn. 238, 332 S.W.2d 660 (1960) (heart
attack at home); Nashville Bridge Co. v. Todd, 199 Tenn. 311, 286 S.W.2d 861 (1955)
(heat stroke on way home); Lynch v. LaRue, 198 Tenn. 101, 278 S.W.2d 85 (1954)
(seven years from electric shock to cerebrovascular disease).
133. The problem of classifying the cases in this area is difficult. Research in most
law books can be done by either of two methods: the "legal topic" method, using a
table of contents with such headings as "power distinguished from authority;" or the
descriptive word method, using an index which includes such words as "theatres,"
"cancer," and the like. Similarly, there are two methods of attempting to categorize
and explain the "arising out of" cases under the compensation act. One is to formulate
a single theory of causation broad enough to serve as the major premise for all the
decisions. The second is the humbler route of grouping the cases more narrowly ac-
cording to the similarity of certain of their more significant facts and creating distinctive
fact pigeonholes into which each case may be consistently fitted. Both methods are
necessary to an understanding of the cases, yet neither is entirely satisfactory. The
reason lies in the nature of those generalizations we call 'legal rules." They have not
been handed down from a mountain-top. These rules are abstractions, generalizations
built up from long successions of cases whose rationales are sufficiently similar to
justify being synthesized into a single general principle. Thus the process by which a
rule is created is much like the process of inductive logic; and the factors from
which the rule of a case of first impression is induced include the words of a statute,
the purposes of a legislature, the nature of the industry being governed, the sympathe-
tic appeal of a cause, and so on. The rule of that case becomes itself a factor in the
process of formulating the rule of the next similar case. The process continues until
there exists a rule capable of being s t out in bold type in a treatise. After a rule is
created in this manner, it is used in opinions as the basis of a deductive pronouncement,
frequently in the form of a syllogism. At this point, the rule seems almost to have ac-
quired a life of its own, independent of the cases which gave birth to it. This de-
ductive form of statement provides an appearance of certainty which is an important
characteristic of law. Yet to some extent, the appearance is deceiving, for few legal
rules are so fixed and immutable that they are not constantly being re-shaped and re-
formed so that in any given appellate case there is a process of inductive logic from
which a rule is derived, and a process of deductive logic from which a conclusion is
derived to dispose of the particular cause before the court. This is particularly true in
an area of law as relatively recent in origin as compensation law. In order to understand
the precedent which exists, therefore, one must be able to understand how injuries
caused by "stress" and injuries caused by "lightning," for example, may be synthesized
into a single "rule," and must at the same time be able to understand how the "rule"
has been created out of statutory language and thorny cases.
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actual cause. The supreme court has specifically rejected the proxi-
mate cause test in its opinions, 134 but the temptation to carry over some
language from the proximate cause cases has been great. As a result,
the court has at times required that an accidental injury in order to
arise out of the employment be one that, viewed after the fact, might
have been contemplated. 35 The similarity of such a requirement to
the foreseeability concept of proximate cause is obvious-and would
be unfortunate, had not the court explicitly stated that the two are not
the same.
The rule which has been adopted in terms is the "added peril' or
"increased risk" doctrine.136 In order for a claimant to recover under
this theory, he must show that his injury was caused by a hazard which
is (to some extent, at least) peculiar to the conditions of his employ-
ment. If strictly applied this theory might unduly narrow the range
of compensability. But the Tennessee court has not applied the doc-
trine in this fashion, as can be seen by even a hasty examination of a
recent horseplay case.13 7 Nonetheless, claimant's petition should be
drawn with regard to what can be proved on trial to be a "hazard of
employment" rather than a "hazard of general human existence." To
do otherwise is to court defeat.13
The liberality in favor of claimants which has been prevalent in
Tennessee decisions may indicate that the added peril approach has
been stretched to its limit and that the court will in the foreseeable
future adopt actual cause as its test. That is, it may require a showing
only that the employment in fact exposed the claimant to the risk,
whether or not it was also a risk to others in the community. Carter
v. Hodges3 9 can be so interpreted, but on the basis of existing prece-
dent it is doubtful that Tennessee is willing to go this far, at least in
name.
140
134. White v. XVhiteway Pharmacy, Inc., 210 Tenn. 449, 455, 360 S.W.2d 12, 15
(1961); Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 6, 236 S.W.2d 977, 979 (1950).
135. "In order to hold this case compensable under our statute each of two questions
must be answered in the affirmative. . . . The second of these two questions . . . is:
Could such an injury reasonably have been contemplated if it bad been thought of at
the time of the employment as a risk incident to [the claimant's] duties?" Jackson v.
Clark & Fay, Inc., 197 Tenn. 135, 137, 270 S.W.2d 389, 390 (1954) (Burnett and
Prewitt, J.J., dissenting). But see W. S. Dickey Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 208 Tenn. 576, 581,
347 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1961).
136. See Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Lett, 201 Tenn. 171, 176, 297 S.W.2d 93, 95
(1956).
137. Ransom v. H. G. Hill Co., supra note 126 (employee slipped wlle skylarking
with a fellow employee during period of inactivity).
138. Reedy v. Mid-State Baptist Hospital, 210 Tenn. 398, 359 S.W.2d 822 (1962)
(semble) (inadequate showing of aggravation by employment; claimant's doctor testi-
fied the cause of her disability was a prior injury).
139. 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211 (1939); see W. S. Dickey Mfg. Co. v. Moore,
208 Tenn. 576, 581, 347 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1961).




B. The Hazards of Employment
Accepting the added peril approach, liberally applied, as the Ten-
nessee rule, what constitute hazards of employment? Dangerous
machinery, explosives, slick floors, and the like furnish obvious ex-
amples; the great bulk of injuries are brought about by such causes and
offer no problem. The outer limits of compensability are much less
obvious, and some consideration should be given to a few of the major
categories of "tough" cases.
The "act of God" cases are difficult to resolve. Two decisions in the
past decade have allowed recovery to claimants who were struck by
lightning while at work.141 The likelihood of being struck was held to
be a risk of the employment in each case because the injured employee
was working with metal. The court took judicial notice that lightning
is attracted by metal. Yet a few years before in Jackson v. Clark &
Fay'42 the court denied compensation (two justices dissenting) to an
employee injured when a truck in which he was being transported was
hit by a tornado. It would seem more than arguable that being re-
quired to be in the open by employment, and thus exposed to the fury
of the tornado, is very nearly the same as being required to work near
lightning-attracting metal.
The assault cases can be resolved more easily. If the assault takes
place on employment premises and has its origins in the employee's
work, resulting injury is compensable. In Dickey Manufacturing Co.
v. Moore,'43 for example, claimant and another employee got into an
argument over the quality of claimant's performance on the job. A
fight ensued and claimant was hurt. Since the assault was employ-
ment-oriented, the injury was held compensable. It should be noted,
however, that the court intimated that even if injury grows out of a
fight over work disputes, an aggressor is not allowed to recover in this
state."14
141. Oman Constr. Co. v. Hodge, supra note 140; Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Lett,
supra note 136.
142. Supra note 135. The case is cited in both Hodge and Lett. It is interesting to
note that although the court is careful to distinguish Jackson rather than overrule it, the
the opinion in Hodge was written by Mr. Justice Prewitt, who dissented in the earlier
case. As to a possible distinction, see 1 LAnsoN § 8.20.
143. Supra note 135; see also Jim Reed Chevrolet Co. v. Watson, 194 Tenn. 617,
254 S.W.2d 733 (1952); Turner v. Bluff City Lumber Co., 189 Tenn. 621, 227
S.W.2d 1 (1950) (same result on similar facts). See also infra at 1152.
144. 208 Tenn. at 583-84, 347 S.W.2d at 497. The point was raised in terms of
Sandlin v. Gentry, 201 Tenn. 509, 300 S.W.2d 897 (1957). In that case it is not en-
tirely clear whether the court held against the claimant both on the grounds of the
aggressor defense and of willful misconduct or only on the latter basis. The limits of
"willful misconduct" have received little discussion in Tennessee. Disobedience of an
order does not necessarily constitute such conduct, Kingsport Foundry & Mach. Works,
Inc. v. Sheffey, 156 Tenn. 150, 299 S.W. 787 (1927); but blatant disregard of an order
resulting in obvious exposure to increased risk may, Leonard v. Cranberry Furnace Co.,
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At the other end of the assault scale is White v. Whiteway Phar-
macy.145 Claimants' decedent was killed at work by her husband, a
former co-employee, because she had been having social engagements
with another man. Since a motive could hardly be more personal than
this, the death was held non-compensable even though the weapon
used belonged to the employer.
Horseplay cases involve assaults in the form of bantering pokes,
pinches, and punches. The Tennessee courts permit recovery so long
as "the things done are the natural and normal thing of the type of
employee who are kept there."'46
Two illustrative cases involving positional risk indicate that the
courts of the state have not yet settled on a firm approach to such
problems. In Carter v. Hodges 47 a traveling salesman who normally
stayed in a hotel during his trips was killed by a hotel fire. The death
was held compensable. In Thornton v. RCA Service Co.,148 claimant
was assaulted by a drunk or insane stranger who entered the restaurant
where claimant was eating while on a business trip. Compensation for
the resulting injury was denied. To reconcile the cases on the grounds
that hotel fires are a more recognized menace than assaults by drunks
appears logically unjustifiable. Hopefully the supreme court will take
the next opportunity to clear up the confusion resulting from these
and other holdings. In each case an employee was unknowingly put
in a place of danger by his work. Either such injuries are compensable
or they are not.149
It has already been pointed out that Tennessee allows compensation
for aggravation of pre-existing conditions. In such cases the courts try
to determine only whether the employment has substantially con-
tributed to the worsened condition; they will not ordinarily attempt to
determine how much of the resulting condition was caused by the
150 Tenn. 346, 265 S.W. 543 (1924). See also note 146 infra.
145. 210 Tenn. 449, 360 S.W.2d 12 (1962).
146. Ransom v. H. G. Hill Co., 205 Tenn. 377, 385, 326 S.W.2d 659, 663 (1959).
In this case an employee who grabbed the seat of another's trousers and tripped as a
result was allowed compensation for the injury thus caused. The defense attempted to
rely on claimant's aggressor status, citing Hawkins v. National Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 164
Tenn. 36, 46 S.W.2d 55 (1932). The court indicated that this defense is limited to
cases of more aggravated conduct than could legitimately be termed horseplay.
147. 175 Tenn. 96, 132 S.W.2d 211 (1939).
148. 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S.W.2d 954 (1949).
149. Compare Whaley v. Patent Button Co., 184 Tenn. 700, 202 S.W.2d 649 (1947)
(compensation allowed for injury resulting when discharged insane former employee
shot at random through factory window) and Carmichael v. J. C. Mahan Motor Co.,
157 Tenn. 613, 11 S.W.2d 672 (1928) (compensation to garage employee shot by air
rifle negligently handled by ten-year-old boy loafing on premises) with Scott v. Shinn,
171 Tenn. 478, 105 S.W.2d 103 (1937) (soft-drink deliveryman injured by robbers at
lunchroom which he was about to enter; compensation denied).
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original disability and how much by the work. 50 A recent amendment
to the code allows employees to waive rights to compensation for
aggravation of certain existing disabilities, notably heart conditions
and occupational diseases.' 5 ' There has not yet been enough time to
evaluate the long-range effect of the amendment, but one can specu-
late that it may prove troublesome to distinguish how much of an
injury has been caused by aggravation and how much is really a new
injury.
Among the most troublesome cases on causation are those in which
an employee is found injured and (because of his death, amnesia, or
ignorance) it is impossible to uncover the precise circumstances sur-
rounding the injury. Claimants in such cases must, of course, rely on
circumstantial evidence. 5 2 In this connection, there exists a "rule of
reasonable inference" with regard to causation: "Where an employee
is found at his post of labor [during the time that he is usually em-
ployed and] without direct evidence of the manner of his death, an
inference may arise of an accident springing out of and in the course
of his employment."153 The rule will not be applied, however, when
more than one reasonable inference as to the cause of death exists.
54
150. The cases are numerous. The following are illustrative: Combustion Eng'r Co. v.
Blanks, 210 Tenn. 233, 357 S.W.2d 625 (1962) (tuberculosis); Huey Bros. Lumber
Co. v. Kirk, 210 Tenn. 170, 357 S.W.2d 50 (1962) (aneurysm); Martha White Baker-
ies, Inc. v. Vance, 204 Tenn. 491, 322 S.W.2d 206 (1959) (cirrhosis); Eslinger v.
Miller Bros., 203 Tenn. 688, 315 S.W.2d 261 (1958) (arteriosclerosis). The same rule
applies to organic weakness or predisposition to injury. Bush Bros. & Co. v. Williams,
197 Tenn. 334, 273 S.W.2d 137 (1954). This basis for recovery may be used even
though not pleaded originally. Norton v. Standard Coosa-Thatcher Co., 203 Tenn.
649, 654-55, 315 S.W.2d 245, 247 (1958).
151. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1109 (Supp. 1963).
152. Heron v. Girdley, 198 Tenn. 110, 121, 277 S.W.2d 402, 407 (1955) (employee
found dead of heart attack in poorly ventilated mine; compensation allowed); see also
Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223 (1953).
153. Eureka Cas. Co. v. Phillips, 133 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd,
233 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1956); see also Cunningham v. Hembree, 195 Tenn. 107, 257
S.W.2d 12 (1953). Having thus made out a prima facie case, plaintiff has satisfied his
burden of going forward with the evidence; the defendant must then present affirmative
evidence in rebuttal. Shockley v. Morristown Produce & Ice Co., 158 Tenn. 148, 154-55,
11 S.W.2d 900, 902 (1928).
154. See, e.g., Wilson v. St. Louis Terminal Distrib. Co., 198 Tenn. 171, 175,
278 S.W.2d 681, 683 (1955) (rule could not be applied to heart attack victim who
had not been engaged in physical exertion since disease would be as reasonable an
inference as accident); Reed v. Langford, 197 Tenn. 587, 276 S.W.2d 735 (1955)
(hotel desk clerk found dead of gunshot wound; employer hotel's guests included
whores, gamblers, drunkards, and touts; compensation denied). The Langford case
seems clearly wrong. See 1 LARSON § 11.33. One is tempted to inquire of the Wilson
case: How much more would really be known (rather than inferred) by the
court if the employee had been engaged in exertion? The preferable approach would
seem to be not to say that where there are conflicting possible inferences, no inference
can be drawn, but to say instead that where two inferences can be drawn and the
medical testimony more strongly supports one, the court will adopt the stronger in-
ference. Howell v. Bacon Co., 98 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Tenn. 1951). The latter ap-
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C. Importance of Medical Testimony
Because the supreme court limits its review in compensation cases
to determining whether any substantial evidence exists to support the
finding of the trial court, and because it will consider lay testimony on
medical matters as part of that evidence,155 some attorneys have grown
skeptical of the importance of thorough preparation of medical evi-
dence. Although this is understandable, it is unfortunate. The position
of the supreme court is not unreasonable. By limiting its review in
these cases, the court encourages the final disposition of cases in lower
courts, thereby eliminating the expense and time involved in appeals.
Accepting an injured party's testimony on how he feels and what
he is able to do is eminently justifiable in light of the difficulty in
assessing such matters medically on any sort of absolute scale.116
Moreover, it is probable that employers and insurers would often have
superior sophistication in regard to medical testimony and would be
able to overwhelm worthwhile claims were trial judges bound to make
judgments wholly on the basis of the weight of expert testimony. Yet
all of this does not make it any easier for a defense attorney who has
carefully prepared his medical proof and brought specialists to trial
to accept a contrary verdict based on the statement of a general
practitioner that he believes the injury might well have been caused
by an employment accident.
Perhaps it is some consolation to .defense lawyers in this uncom-
fortable position that the courts have been more stringent in requiring
medical testimony in regard to cause than in regard to the extent of
injury. True, an opinion of a physician that the employment might
possibly have caused an injury is admissible,15 7 but it has also been
held that testimony of that sort is not enough by itself to support a
verdict for the claimant.15 8 And the recent decision in Reedy v. Mid-
proach would seem to have a strong analogy in tort law, where res ipsa loquitur may
be applied even though "many inferences are possible, and none of them is so clear
that the court can say that it is compulsory." PRossEa, TORTs § 43, at 212 (2d ed. 1955).
It must be pointed out, however, that should the court allow an expansion of this
rule, it would be necessary to modify the procedural effect of Shockley. The role of
the judge in compensation cases as trier of both law and fact makes the tort analogy
less satisfactory.
155. See, e.g., Bush Bros. & Co. v. Williams, 197 Tenn. 334, 273 S.W.2d 137 (1954).
156. See, e.g., Buck & Simmons Auto & Elec. Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn.
115, 250 S.W.2d 39 (1952).
157. Combustion Eng'r Co. v. Blanks, 210 Tenn. 233, 238, 357 S.W.2d 625, 627
(1962); Benjamin F. Shaw Co. v. Musgrave, 189 Tenn. 1, 9-10, 222 S.W.2d 22, 25
(1949). But cf. Sanders v. Blue Ridge Glass Corp., 161 Tenn. 535, 541-42, 33 S.W.2d
84, 85 (1930).
158. Mason & Dixon Lines v. Gregory, 206 Tenn. 525, 537-39, 334 S.W.2d 939,
945-46 (1960); Lynch v. LaRue, 198 Tenn. 101, 104, 278 S.W.2d 85, 86 (1955). Such
testimony must be accompanied by other evidence permitting the inference to be made.
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State Baptist Hospital59 stands as testimony that trial judges will not
necessarily be so liberal in their application of the statute as to weigh
an injured claimant's testimony as to causation more heavily than that
of doctors.
VIII. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
There are two basic statutory alternatives available in connection
with occupational diseases. The basic coverage provision is section
50-1101, which lists as compensable nine specific categories of disease.
All employers subject to the remainder of the workmen's compensation
law are covered by this provision. If an employer wishes, however, he
may elect under sections 50-1103 and -1104 to be covered for all oc-
cupational diseases, rather than just those listed. Experience since
1947 indicates that such elections will probably be rare. Some may
be expected, however, because an employer might prefer to pay a
greater number of compensation claims of limited amount than be
subject to the risk of a smaller number of tort claims for which larger
damages might be awarded. Few cases have reached the appellate
courts yet under either provision. Those which have suggest only a
few points of major interest.
First, it should be pointed out that the list of diseases is not entirely
exclusive. In the case of Whitehead v. Holston Defense Corp.,160 the
court was asked to allow recovery for an employee suffering from
pulmonary fibrosis, not one of the named diseases. In answer to de-
fendant's objection on this basis, the court replied:
While it is true the Legislature listed nine occupational diseases as com-
pensable, yet a liberal interpretation of this section does not require that the
disease from which an employee suffers must be proved to that degree of
scientific exactness as to classify it as one of these listed occupational diseases.
Medical science, great and important as it is in serving humanity, is not an
exact science. Moreover men of science have not as yet given a name to
every human ailment. Some diseases are so closely related to certain classi-
fied diseases that they must be denominated as "occupational".... [W]hen
the statute provides "'occupational disease,' means one (1) of the scheduled
diseases arising out of and in the course of employment", the legislative intent
was to include such related physical ailments in causative effect as being
compensable.
161
Thus, not only the listed diseases but also those generically close to
This other evidence may be slight. See Powers v. Beasley, 197 Tenn. 549, 276 S.W.2d
720 (1955).
159. 210 Tenn. 398, 359 S.W.2d 822 (1962); see also American Cas. Co. v. Ball,
366 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. 1963) (insufficient medical proof that hip and side injury
caused cancer).
160. 205 Tenn. 326, 326 S.W.2d 482 (1959).
161. Id. at 332-33, 326 S.W.2d at 484-85.
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those listed are compensable.162
Similarly, it has been held that diseases not listed but which are
the result or outgrowth of a listed disease are compensable. In Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Miller,163 claimant suffered from panniculitis,
which she claimed was the outgrowth of occupationally caused derma-
titis. Dermatitis is among the listed diseases, panniculitis is not. Al-
though troubled by the conflicting medical testimony on whether the
dermatitis could have caused the later condition, the supreme court
determined that there was sufficient evidence of causation and allowed
a verdict for claimant to stand. The importance of medical testimony
to demonstrate the connection between a listed disease and one not
listed is too obvious to require discussion.
The second principal problem area with occupational disease is
being able to distinguish between those injuries and accidental in-
juries arising out of repeated traumas. In Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed,164
the injury involved was neuritis and atrophy resulting from repeated
traumas to the ulnar nerve. Defendant urged that this was essentially
a disease rather than an accidental injury and that, not being listed in
section 50-1101, it was non-compensable. The reasoning of the court
in answering this argument was that
generally an occupational disease in addition to the definition in the statute
is a disease that comes from common experience as visited upon persons
engaged in a particular occupation, in the usual course of events, as a painter
affected with lead colic or lead poisoning; phosphorous poisoning common
to those who work in the manufacture of fireworks and things of that kind. 165
In other words an occupational disease is one which results from the
nature, rather than merely from the conditions, of the work. This
distinction is elusive and could prove troublesome. In time, it is likely
that Tennessee will enlarge the coverage of its occupational disease
statute; this would have the effect of making the distinction of little
practical significance except in relation to pleadings and perhaps
notice requirements. The difficulties in regard to pleadings have been
obviated by a holding that a claimant may present evidence tending
to show the existence both of disease and of accidental injury, amend-
ing the pleadings if necessary.166
The third major problem with the occupational disease provisions
162. See also Tennessee Tufting Co. v. Potter, 206 Tenn. 620, 628, 337 S.W.2d
601, 602 (1960).
163. 210 Tenn. 301, 358 S.W.2d 316 (1962).
164. 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65 (1961).
165. Id. at 119, 350 S.W.2d at 71.
166. Norton v. Standard Coosa-Thatcher Co., 203 Tenn. 649, 315 S.W.2d 245
(1958); see also Cunningham v. Hembree, 195 Tenn. 107, 112, 257 S.W.2d 12, 14
(1953).
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concerns the stringency of the proof-of-causation requirement. Section
50-1101 lists six standards which must be met in order for a claimant
to have borne the burden of proof on this issue. The third standard
listed is proximate cause. The other five would all seem less rigorous
than this one provision, so that one is struck with the question: Why,
if proximate cause is to be the standard, did the legislature feel it
necessary to list other standards, less rigorous than this167 or which
would be regarded as part of a proximate cause test? The only case
which has yet discussed the causation requirement at length was in a
federal rather than a state court. It spoke more of "direct cause" than
of proximate cause.1' The Virginia courts, interpreting an almost
identical statute, have set forth one doctrine which may be adopted in
Tennessee: If the proof shows that it is at least as likely some cause
other than employment brought on the disease, the plaintiff has not
successfully borne his burden of proof.169 Larson has suggested that
the approach of this sort of statute is quite similar to the older"peculiar risk" (added peril) test for accidental injuries. 170
167. The sixth standard listed, for instance, seems less rigorous to this writer.
168. Lyons v. Holston Defense Corp., 142 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
169. Van Gueder v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 548, 65 S.E.2d 565 (1951).
170. 1 LAwSON § 41.32.
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